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Private Schools and Tax Advantage in England — the longue durée 
 
Introduction 
State financing of schools invariably provokes questions regarding educational and social 
inequalities and the redistributive justice potential. Austerity policies have adversely 
impacted state school funding in England since 2010, resulting in much public disquiet and 
debate. However, the state funding that takes a more circuitous route, involving sizeable tax 
concessions for the English and Welsh1 private (fee-paying) schools that have charitable 
status, and which are frequently very resource-rich, has received significantly less detailed 
and direct attention from researchers (e.g. Lowe, 2020); much of that research is now dated 
(e.g. Walford, 1987;1988). In contrast, there has been, in the last ten years at least, a 
relatively significant and contentious popular debate about the status and privileges of these 
schools. This paper begins with the premise that appropriate historical studies are necessary 
to challenge 'the parochialism of the present' (Harris, 1983, 332) and to unmask the power 
relations inherent to these long-standing tax concessions. We chart how these tax 
arrangements arose over an extended time period through the tight entanglement of tax law, 
charity law and the interventions of legal, political and educational elites. Adopting a socio-
legal historical perspective, we unravel the principal strands of this entanglement to explicate 
the current situation.  
 
Contexts and concepts 
6.5% of children attend fee-paying private schools in the UK (Independent Schools Council, 
2018). These variously labelled schools have heterogeneous status and resources.  The terms 
‘private’, ‘fee paying’ and ‘independent’ apply to them all, but only the most prestigious are 
called ‘elite’, and they regard themselves as having ‘public school’ status (Kenway et al, 
2017). The nomenclature is slippery and, as Simon (1975) illustrates, membership of the 
‘public school’ category has long been contested, shifting and expanding over time. Most 
private schools model themselves on these elite schools and, arguably, they all benefit from 
being associated, no matter how remotely, with them. For clarity, we only use the term 
‘private schools’.  
The private schools that are our focus all have charitable status. In 2016, the UK government 
estimated that there were 2300 private schools in the UK – including some very small 
organisations with pupil numbers in single digits. Of these, some 1300 have charitable status. 
The Independent Schools Council, which represents almost 1400 of the more substantial 
schools, reported in 2019 that 74% of its member organisations – 1012 schools – held 
charitable status (Fairburn 2019).  
 
Private in the sense of not state-owned, these charitable schools are also not-for-profit – they 
have no shareholders or other private owners legally entitled to extract financial 
surpluses/profits, which must instead be retained for use towards the organisation’s charitable 
purposes. They all charge fees and the cost is high, albeit with around 4-8% of fees being 
remitted via full or partial scholarships or bursaries. Whilst median household disposable 
 
1 Whilst tax law is largely the same throughout the UK, charity law differs and so this paper focuses on England 
and Wales, where most of the schools are located.  
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income in the UK in 2017 was £27,300 (Office of National Statistics 2018), fees for boarding 
students at the most expensive private schools are typically £35-£40,000 a year (The Times 4 
March 2017). Even the fees at day schools in the North and Midlands, well-regarded and 
highly ranked academically but less socially prestigious, are around £12,000 a year 
(Independent Schools Yearbook 2018).  
 
The tax position of these charitable schools is technically complicated. The legal language is 
often obscure and, the underlying principles can be counterintuitive and are frequently 
masked by apparent objectivity and the rhetoric of normalisation. The schools, and their 
private donors, enjoy complete or partial exemption from a wide range of taxes.  
 
Tax breaks explicitly relieve particular organisations or classes of individuals from taxes 
otherwise payable. Because this has the same net effect in bookkeeping terms as the state 
collecting taxes and then spending them, tax breaks are classed as a form of public 
expenditure known as ‘tax expenditure’. As tax expenditure is income foregone, it generally 
escapes annual budgetary scrutiny because there is no actual decision to spend cash. Tax 
expenditures also suffer from non-reporting; tax not due is rarely reported or calculated, the 
government provides no official estimates and UK taxpayers have an absolute right to 
confidentiality. Tax expenditure is an imprecise tool for spending public money effectively 
due to its relative lack of transparency, enabling the hidden operation of power in favour of 
certain organisations and classes of individuals (Boden, Childs and Wild 1995).   
 
Private schools’ tax breaks are public expenditure that directly benefits them. The precise 
value of these concessions is unknown – the government makes no estimates (Fairburn 
2019). In 2014 the Labour party estimated that the value of Income Tax relief to these 
schools was £700m (The Telegraph, 24 November 2014). A 2017 study, based on Freedom 
of Information Act requests, estimated that the schools’ partial exemption from local property 
taxes was worth a further £105m a year (The Guardian, 11 June 2017). School fees are not 
subject to Value Added Tax, although this exemption arises from education being an exempt 
supply under VAT law, rather than the charitable status of the schools, and the value of this 
exemption is estimated (again by the Labour party) at £2.2 billion a year (The Guardian, 6 
April 2017). Private schools also claim refunds on some tax paid by donors on their 
donations, and are exempt from Capital Gains Tax. No estimates of the value of these reliefs 
are available. These sums are likely to be significant – possibly in excess of £3 billion a year. 
Schools also benefit from additional tax-incentivised donations by tax relief on gifts and 
Inheritance Tax (Chesterman, 1999). The UK government’s predicted expenditure on state 
school education in 2019 is £87.7bn (UKPublicspending.co.uk, 2019), suggesting that, per 
child, the entire private school sector (including non-charities) receives tax relief roughly 
equivalent to half the level of public expenditure on state school students. The amount per 
student in charitable schools will be greater, but cannot be estimated. 
 
 
A condensed socio-legal history   
Tax breaks for private schools have a complex legal history best understood via a critical 
socio-legal, rather than a doctrinal, legal historical approach. Doctrinal approaches focus on 
statutes, cases, scholarly commentaries and judges’ decisions. Critical socio-legal approaches 
utilise these resources, but also address pertinent aspects of the law-in-practice, its meanings 
and functions, in an interdisciplinary manner. They interrogate the ‘ampersand’ in the socio-
legal (Fisk, 2019) via a both-ways, both-and approach, examining how society influences the 
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law and how the law influences society. In this paper we bring the history of tax law into 
conversation with two strands of critical sociology—tax (e.g. Boden, Killian, Mulligan and 
Oats, 2010; James, 2017) and elite schools (e.g. Kenway and Koh, 2015). Both fields 
examine and expose the material, institutional and discursive resources that society’s most 
powerful and privileged groups mobilise in their own interests.  
We adopt a linear temporality to reveal, over the longue durée, how the particular legal, 
political and social dynamics are deeply entrenched. While identifying the slow and steady 
accretion of their normalisation, we also show how these dynamics have been regularly 
renewed, or strategically readjusted, in comparatively short but decisive episodes. As 
researchers of the socially dominant we clarify the naming practices involved, the meanings 
they mobilized and who their representations represented. Our primary sources are court and 
media reports, official reports, political party manifestos, legislation and parliamentary 
proceedings read through the lens of law, education and social policy research.    
 
Charity: for the poor or the wealthy? 
The English2 law concept of charity dates from the late 16th and early 17th centuries, when 
feudalism and its associated systems of poor relief were in decline. This necessitated new 
laws and, as disputes ensued, the courts became involved. Over time, these court cases 
generated case (common) law via precedents, interpolating the legislation to produce a 
complex assemblage. A suite of Elizabethan Poor Laws were enacted, including the 
Charitable Uses Act 1601, which was designed to regulate and protect charitable assets. The 
Preamble included education as a charitable purpose. 
 
Whereas Landes Tenementes Rentes Annuities Profittes Hereditamentes, Goodes 
Chattels Money and Stockes of Money, have bene heretofore given limitted appointed 
and assigned, as well by the Queenes most excellent Majestie and her moste noble 
Progenitors, as by sondrie other well disposed persons, some for Releife of aged 
impotent and poore people, some for Maintenance of sicke and maymed Souldiers 
and Marriners, Schooles of Learninge, Free Schooles and Schollers in Universities…  
(quoted in Scott and Wethered, 2012:1) 
 
Under the Act, a charitable purpose was one that fell within the definitions in the preamble, 
existed for public (not private) benefit and for the relief of poverty (Malik, 2008). Sir Francis 
Moore, an eminent lawyer, stated in 1607 that that ‘poverty is the principal and essential 
circumstance…within the compass of this Statute’ (Jones, 1983:121). In 1700 the courts 
ruled that only free schools were included under the Charitable Uses Act 1601 because, 
whilst education was a charitable purpose, charging fees was incommensurate with the relief 
of poverty (Jones, 1983).  
 
Law is dynamic, and the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1735 effectively removed the 
absolute requirement regarding the relief of poverty (Jones, 1983). In the 1805 case 
of Morice v Bishop of Durham, the judge, reflecting the 1601 Act, classified charitable 
purposes as: the relief of the indigent, the advancement of learning, the advancement of 
 
2 English law applies to England and Wales. 
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religion, and the advancement of objects of general public utility (Malik, 2008), conducted 
for the benefit of the public.   
 
Due to the persistence in law of the Preamble to the 1601 Act, all schools, whether for the 
poor or not, could now be charities if they provided public benefit – which was not, and still 
is not, defined in statute. In 1807, the courts ruled that the not-for-profit Rugby and Harrow 
schools, despite admitting fee-paying students, could have charitable status (Jones, 1983). In 
the 1827 case of Attorney General v Lord Lonsdale the heirs to an estate argued that a school 
endowed under an aristocrat’s will could not be charitable because ‘being for the education of 
gentlemen’s sons, is not a charity’. The judge disagreed, stating that ‘the institution of a 
school for the sons of gentlemen, is not, in popular language, a charity; but in view of the 
Statute of Elizabeth [the 1601 Act], all schools for learning are so to be considered’ (Reports 
of Cases, 1843:110).   
 
By the late 19th century, the determination of charitable status had been reserved to the 
courts, presided over by judges who have the power to make the law mean what they say it 
means (James, 2010). In 1891 Judge Lord MacNaughten defined charity authoritatively for 
legal purposes, noting that this differed from the ‘popular meaning’. 
 
That according to the law of England a technical meaning is attached to the word 
"charity," and to the word "charitable" in such expressions as "charitable uses," 
"charitable trusts," or "charitable purposes," cannot, I think, be denied…How far then, 
it may be asked, does the popular meaning of the word "charity" correspond with its 
legal meaning? "Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts 
for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the 
advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, 
not falling under any of the preceding heads. The trusts last referred to are not the less 
charitable in the eye of the law, because incidentally they benefitted the rich as well 
as the poor, as indeed, every charity that deserves the name must do either directly or 
indirectly. (Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel, [1891] 
A.C. 531) 
 
During the 19th century the definition of charity thoroughly departed from its popular 
meaning, evolving into a complex legal concept.  This happened at the hands of judges with 
strong links to elite private schools. Also during the 19th century the schools that came to be 
called the Great Schools were transformed.  
 
These schools departed from their origins as ‘societies of boys’ and became elite institutions, 
designed to train young men to join the upper echelons of Church. In the 1810 case of 
Attorney-General v Earl of Clarendon, it was argued that the ingress of fee-paying boarding 
students had made it impossible for poor scholars to remain at the school in question (Synge, 
2015). In the 1842 case of Attorney-General v Earl of Stamford, it was argued that the 
education provided had been ‘adapted almost exclusively for the wealthier classes’ (Synge, 
2015:188). Many schools had endowments or foundations to benefit poor boys. But, as they 
developed into institutions designed to produce men of the ‘right’ moral fibre, concerns arose 
that admitting the lower orders might adversely affect the schools’ moral character (Kenway 
and Fahey, 2015). School governors being granted discretion to give scholarships to 
whomsoever they pleased resolved these concerns; their decisions tended to favour the upper 
classes of modest means (Shrosbee, 1998). Schools founded to educate the poor (Lowe, 
2020) increasingly served the (usually wealthy) elite – breeding grounds for statesmen, 
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military officers and colonial overlords (Chandos, 1984). They were central to sustaining and 
adapting the class structure of England as the sons of wealthy industrialists joined those of 
the gentry to gain powerful connections and class ‘polish’. The schools emphasised 
hierarchy, generated a sense of entitlement to rule and helped forge life-long and inter-
generational bonds (Gaythorne-Hardy 1977).  
 
Intensely conservative, the schools opposed an increasingly secular state and increased public 
provision of education for the lower orders. The prospect of an educated working class was 
an anathema (Ball 2005). The schools used their considerable influence and connections in 
legal, political and media institutions to advance their own, and their past and present 
students’, interests. Lowe (2020) meticulously documents how the prestigious ‘Great 
Schools’ (Charterhouse, Eton, Harrow, Merchants Taylors, Rugby, Shrewsbury, St Paul’s, 
Westminster and Winchester) worked with Conservative parliamentarians in the first half of 
the 19th century to ensure that they were excluded from the general regulatory regime for 
charities then being developed by the state.  
 
This position was confirmed by the 1864 Clarendon Commission report on the management, 
finance and educational provision of the Great Schools (Clarendon Report, [1864] 2005), 
which recommended that they become autonomous institutions. The ensuing Public Schools 
Act 1868 freed seven of the nine schools from any government, crown or church control (St 
Paul’s and Merchant Taylor’s School successfully argued they should be excluded). They 
were deemed ‘public schools’ because the only entry restriction was fees, not locality or 
religious affiliation (Kenway and Fahey, 2015). The Great School system established a 
governance model to which many other schools aspired. In 1869 the Headmasters’ 
Conference (HMC) was formed, eventually becoming a powerful lobbying force for the 
sector once initial internal tensions around issues of status were resolved (Honey, 1977).  
 
 Trade or a charity? 
Unsurprisingly, the schools turned their attention to fiscal matters. Income Tax was 
introduced permanently in 1842, and the Great Schools were immediately exempted (Jones, 
1983). They were all endowed schools – charitable trusts unable to distribute profits and with 
no private owners. Although some, by this point, charged fees, they were deemed not to be 
trading and therefore not subject to Income Tax on surplus income.  
 
In contrast, the emerging non-endowed schools were considered to be trading and became 
subject to Income Tax as if they were commercial businesses (Jones, 1983). Whilst, by the 
end of the 19th century, they were mostly not making any profit to be taxed on, they were 
paying various property taxes. After 1874, when appeals against the tax authority’s decisions 
became possible, a number of schools took court cases, with varying success, to establish that 
they were akin to the Great Schools and so exempt from all taxes (Jones, 1983). These were 
attempts to change the legal status of individual schools, rather than the law itself.  
 
A decisive episode that demonstrates the schools’ self-interested tenacity, and powerful 
networks, involved the non-endowed, not-for-profit Brighton College. It operated at a loss 
until 1910, but then started achieving a trading surplus, resulting in tax charges. Edwardes 
Jones, a former pupil, member of the college’s governing council and a King’s Counsel 
persuaded the college that the tax assessments could be challenged and offered his services 
pro bono. Some exemptions were achieved by 1917 and incorporated into law by 1918. In 
1921, the tax authorities conceded all points on property taxes on the eve of a court hearing 
(Jones, 1983).  
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By 1921 the college became subject to a new Corporation Profits Tax, which would capture 
the college’s surplus income. An arrangement was made for a question to be asked in the 
House of Commons by JFP Rawlinson, the MP for Cambridge University (Oxford and 
Cambridge then had their own members of parliament) and a representative of the university 
on the college’s council. Rawlinson lobbied hard: the Finance Act 1921 exempted all 
charitable, non-profit distributing companies or those established solely for religious or 
educational purposes from Corporation Profits Tax (Jones, 1983). 
 
Edwardes Jones’ final battle was for exemption to Income Tax on profits. In 1923 the Special 
Commissioners (a tax tribunal) ruled that the college was carrying on a taxable trade because 
it charged fees. The college appealed to the High Court, with Edwardes Jones as one of the 
barristers and the chair of the school governor’s own law firm acting as solicitors. Brighton 
College argued that, because it could not distribute profits, it was not carrying on a trade. The 
judge agreed, leading The Times to commend him and to urge a change in the law for all 
private schools. The tax authorities appealed to a higher court (Jones, 1983).  
 
By 1917, some 30 of the newer Victorian non-endowed schools, including Brighton College, 
had joined the HMC. They were anxious to achieve the same tax advantages as the Great 
Schools. In 1923 the HMC joined Brighton College in the legal fray, providing a sizeable 
£2000 fighting fund. In 1924, the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s decision, 
ruling that it was not within the definition of a trade that one aimed to make a profit for 
distribution. In 1925 the House of Lords (as the Supreme Court was then known) rejected 
Brighton College’s further appeal, ruling that ‘in providing an education for money’ the 
college was carrying on a trade and the use of those profits was immaterial to its tax status 
(Jones, 1983:127). The decision was unanimous, but one judge noted that he felt unhappy at 
the label of ‘trade’ being applied in these circumstances. Another noted that few of these 
schools made a trading profit anyway, and that their income from property and investments 
was already free of tax (Jones, 1983).  
 
Yet these meagre bills proved inflammatory. Having exhausted its legal options, Brighton 
College, with the support of other HMC schools, sought to change the law. The Times noted 
that ‘it is not a bad thing that the matter should be settled and the road cleared for legislation’ 
(Jones 1983:127). Rawlinson raised the matter in parliament again. The headmaster of Eton 
suggested that the government had every reason to wish the public school system well: all 21 
men in the 1926 cabinet went to a private school – 18 to the ‘Great Schools’ and seven alone 
to Eton (Jones, 1983). 
 
The schools shifted to a more public-spirited stance. They claimed that by providing 
education at direct parental expense, they relieved the public exchequer of significant cost 
and left more resources for state schools. In challenging economic times the government was 
reluctant to grant further tax breaks; the few schools that had made a trading profit were in a 
privileged position, and tax relief would simply advantage them further, allowing capital 
accumulation at a time of straitened public finances. Despite these counter-arguments, in 
1927 all charities were exempted from Income Tax on trading profits that arose in the course 
of the primary activity of the charity. This change is remarkable as it was introduced in the 
Budget of Expedients, designed to repair the country’s finances after the General Strike 
(Sabine, 1966).  
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These successive legal and parliamentary triumphs had unfolding consequences over the 20th 
and early 21st centuries.   
 
.  
Recent parliamentary politics versus the courts 
 
Britain’s two main parties have consistently split along party lines regarding the tax and 
charitable status of private schools. The Conservative party was, and remains, the schools’ 
ally – a significant number of past and present Cabinet members attended them (Sutton Trust, 
2019). The Labour party initially lacked a strategy for directly tackling the issue (Tapper, 
2003). It initially supposed that the growth in, and improvement of, the state sector would 
lead to private schools withering away (Moffat, 1989). However, private schools continued to 
prosper during the 20th century, extending their remit to the burgeoning middle classes. 
Indeed, the schools accrued yet further tax advantages. For instance, in 1960 they were 
exempted from 50% of local property taxes and local authorities could give a greater 
exemption if they wished (Walford, 1987).  
 
Only in its February 1974 election manifesto did Labour announce that ‘all forms of tax-
relief and charitable status for public schools will be withdrawn’ (Labour Party, 1974a). By 
its October 1974 manifesto, this had hardened to a commitment to ‘withdraw tax relief and 
charitable status from Public Schools, as a first step towards our long-term aim of phasing out 
fee paying in schools’ (Labour Party, 1974b). This policy was never implemented because 
the Labour government became embroiled in bitter industrial disputes, followed by the 
election of the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher in 1979.  
 
Thatcherism advocated the withdrawal of the state from service provision, as far as was 
practicable, emphasising ‘individual choice’. As studies have subsequently shown, 
educational choice has proved illusory for many (e.g. Ball, Bowe and Gewitz, 1996). 
Significant tax reductions, especially for higher earners, transferred financial resources from 
the state to taxpayers, delegating spending decisions to private, unaccountable individuals 
and businesses (Chesterman, 1999). Private philanthropy (as opposed to state entitlement) 
was promoted by the extension of tax breaks for charitable donations.  
 
These reforms significantly boosted private schools’ finances by giving the wealthy a greater 
ability to pay fees and by encouraging donations. Tax breaks on charitable donations provide 
relief at individuals’ marginal (highest) rate, so the higher one’s rate of tax, the more the tax 
refunded These changes were therefore regressive: the wealthy could not only give more 
absolutely to their causes than the poor could, but also got a larger proportional tax rebate 
(Chesterman, 1999).  Whilst school fees do not count as charitable donations, wealthy 
taxpayers can now make substantial donations to their old, or their children’s schools, and the 
tax that should have been paid on this sum will be refunded, split between the school and the 
donor.  
 
By 1986, the Tory government had extended the tax relief that companies could claim on 
donations to charities, making it easier for wealthy parents or alumni to make tax-deductible 
donations to their children’s schools via their own incorporated businesses.  Walford (1987) 
explains that, subsequent to these changes, the schools developed sophisticated fund raising 
efforts, further cementing their social and political networks. Additional advantages came 
with an exemption from the tax payable on legal transactions such as property purchases and, 
very importantly, Inheritance Tax. Walford (1987) gives the example of an Old Boy of 
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Giggleswick School who died in 1986 leaving £1m to his alma mater. The school got the full 
amount. Had he died three years earlier, there would probably have been a £450,000 tax bill.  
 
Tony Blair’s 1997 New Labour government espoused Third Way policies in which the state 
works in partnership with private providers. Charitable private schools were to be encouraged 
to contribute their (implicitly) superior expertise to improving the wider educational sector 
(Dunn, 2012). Importantly, the government’s strategy unit saw a problem with organisations 
that met the legal definition of charitable purpose but did not meet public expectations of 
delivering public benefit (Synge, 2015). The strategy unit wanted the government to assess 
each charity’s public benefit, including private schools, on a case-by-case basis and, where it 
was deemed inadequate, to work with the organisation to improve it (Synge, 2015; Dunn, 
2012).  
 
Problematically, the strategy unit did not fully understand charity law, as developed in the 
courts (Synge, 2015). As Synge explains, the unit conflated charitable purposes with 
charitable activities – yet they are different in law. Purposes are stated aims whereas 
activities are what charities actually do. This confusion led the strategy unit to believe that 
private schools were obliged to work in partnership with the public sector – an approach 
ultimately doomed to failure (Dunn 2012).  
 
Competing notions of public benefit  
The ensuing Charities Act 2006 gave the first English statutory definition of a charity. This 
confirmed common law – they had to be established for charitable purposes (which were 
listed, and included the advancement of education) and be for public benefit. The Act 
provided no statutory definition of public benefit, leaving it to common (case) law, with 
guidance on the law to be issued by a new Charity Commission, accountable to parliament.  
 
The Commission issued its guidance in 2008, having apparently taken no external legal 
advice (Synge, 2015). Two aspects of the guidance proved contentious. The first was that 
people in poverty should not be excluded from the opportunity to benefit from charities’ 
activities. The second was that fees charged by charities should not unduly restrict the 
opportunity of people to participate. Effectively, this guidance sought to compel school 
trustees to permit all poorer people ready access to private schools. The Commission issued 
further guidance on fee-charging, stating that ‘offering free or subsidised access is an obvious 
and, in many cases, the simplest way in which charities can provide opportunities to benefit 
for people who cannot afford fees’ (Fairburn, 2019:19). It noted that this was not compulsory.  
 
The Commission assumed that it could specifically direct charities towards what it 
considered appropriate public benefit activities (Synge, 2015). It started undertaking 
assessments of the public benefit provided by individual charities, including private schools. 
Two schools were found wanting and given a year to ‘to show how they would ensure a 
sufficient opportunity to benefit in a material way for those who could not afford the fees, 
including people in poverty’ (Fairburn, 2019: 19). Addressing the HMC in 2009, Charity 
Commission chair Suzi Leather insisted that the Commission’s guidance properly reflected 
the law. However, she said ‘the law is not static, and we have had to consider how the legal 
authorities, many of which were decided in a different social climate, should be interpreted in 
a modern context’ – she expected charities to comply with the guidelines within five years 
(Holt, 2009). Leather acknowledged that legal challenges to the Commission’s guidance were 
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inevitable. But private schools responded to regulatory pressure and started to increase the 
numbers of means-tested scholarships offered. 
 
In the face of this regulatory regime, the schools reverted, once again, to the courts (Synge, 
2015). The Independent Schools Council, an umbrella body of seven associations including 
the HMC, applied for judicial review of the Commission’s guidance, arguing that it was 
‘erroneous and over prescriptive, usurping trustees’ discretion, and expressed concern at its 
uncertainty’ (Sloan, 2012: 45).  Simultaneously, the Attorney General (the government’s 
chief legal adviser) Dominic Grieve sought clarification from the Upper Tribunal (the 
principal tax court) on the public benefit requirements of private schools. He argued that 
there appeared to ‘be uncertainty as to the operation of charity law in the context of fee-
charging independent schools’ (Fairburn, 2019: 20). Grieve attended Westminster School – 
one of the Great Schools.  
 
In its lengthy and complex 2011 judgement, the Upper tribunal identified two aspects of the 
public benefit test. The first ‘dictates that the nature of the charitable purpose itself must be 
beneficial to the community’ (Sloan, 2012: 45. The court concluded that  
 
neither a court nor the Commission could decide the political question of whether the 
public benefit in the first sense provided by independent schools was outweighed by 
the “dis-benefits” arising from the charging of fees and the impact of independent 
schools on the public as a whole. It would be difficult to demonstrate that an 
otherwise charitable purpose was rendered non-charitable because of its wider 
consequences for society. (Sloan, 2012: 45) 
 
The court confined itself to the second aspect, which ‘requires that those who benefit from 
the purpose must be sufficiently numerous to constitute “a section of the public”’ (Sloan, 
2012: 46), which it ruled was a matter of common law. Sloan (2012:46) notes  
 
When considering whether the activities of an existing charitable school are consistent 
with the public benefit requirement, the focus would be primarily on the direct 
benefits, such as scholarships, provided to students. While the sharing of broadly 
educational facilities with state schools could contribute to the satisfaction of the 
public benefit requirement, the Tribunal doubted that making such facilities available 
to the community as a whole would be sufficiently direct to do so unless that 
somehow implemented an educational object. The Tribunal was also sceptical about 
the argument that independent schools provide a benefit by removing students from 
the state sector. 
 
The court concluded that private schools can be charities unless their constitution specifically 
debars those unable to afford the fees or where they must always charge full fees (Synge, 
2015) – neither of which applied to the schools. It also found that activities in pursuit of 
charitable purposes are solely the trustees’ responsibility, and cannot be directed by the 
courts or the Charity Commission. This meant that private schools could not be obliged to 
offer significant numbers of means-tested scholarships. The court also ruled that the 
Commission’s guidance that fee levels must not exclude poorer people was simply ‘wrong’ 
(Synge, 2015:186).  
 
Concurrent with this case, the new Conservative-led government was pushing new charities 
legislation through parliament. The 2011 Act, which replaced much of the 2006 Act, still 
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defined a charity as an organisation established for charitable purposes providing public 
benefit, and again left the matter of what constituted public benefit to common law. In a new 
development, automatic presumption of public benefit associated with any purpose was 
specifically debarred. Schools must therefore now demonstrate that they provide public 
benefit. 
 
The new Act engendered a new Charity Commission, which again had to produce guidance 
on the common law of public benefit – this time incorporating the Upper Tribunal’s decision. 
The Commission’s guidance notes that 
 
• In determining whether a school is acting in the public benefit, the primary focus must 
be on the direct benefits it provides (such as scholarships), although all of the 
charitable benefits can be taken into account.  
• A student whose family can pay fees is no less a potentially beneficiary than one 
without the possibility of having their fees paid – both need an education.  
• The extent to which schools need to charge fees to meet their expenses can be 
considered and, if there is a reliance on fee income, for ‘admissions to be weighted in 
favour of potential beneficiaries able to pay fees’ (Fairburn 2019: 10).  
• When fees are so high that poor families could not afford them, the trustees must 
provide a benefit for the poor above the minimal or tokenistic – beyond that, the level 
of provision is at the discretion of the trustees.  
• The definition of ‘poor’ caused some issues and the Commission stated that schools 
might look not just at a student’s family circumstances, but also whether other 
charities might give assistance. 
• If the school provides luxurious facilities, then the onus of demonstrating public 
benefit is increased.  
(summarised from Fairburn, 2019) 
 
In further guidance on how fee-paying schools might enable the poor to benefit (Charity 
Commission, 2013), the first item on the list was bursaries or assisted places, but there were 
numerous other suggestions, such as sponsoring state academy schools; distributing funds via 
a grant making body; allowing state school pupils to use facilities such as swimming pools; 
seconding staff; or, having joint cultural activities with state schools.  
 
In 2012 a review into the operation of charity law mandated under the Charities Act 2006, 
chaired by Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, was published. Hodgson is a Conservative 
member of the House of Lords who attended Shrewsbury – one of the Great Schools. His 
review recommended against a statutory definition of public benefit ‘in order to retain the 
flexibility attached to the common law definition’ (Fairburn, 2019:22). The Conservative-led 
government agreed. In 2013 the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee 
published its report into public benefit and charities. The report argued that ‘it is for 
Parliament to resolve the issues of the criteria for charitable status and public benefit, not the 
Charity Commission, which is a branch of the executive’ (Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2013: para 86). The Conservative-led government disagreed, stressing the 
importance of the flexibility provided by the courts, enabling them to respond to social 
change. The emphasis on flexibility appears disingenuous given the significant 




In 2012 Commission chair, Suzi Leather told the Public Administration Select Committee 
that ‘the issue of charitable status of independent schools was “one that is heavily 
ideologically laden in public debate”’ (Fairburn, 2019:22). Arguably, the regulatory and legal 
processes are too. The Upper Tribunal case and the 2011 Act were mutually reinforcing in 
quashing the attempted Blairite reforms. They sequestered the issue of public benefit to the 
courts.  
 
This is potentially jurisprudentially problematic –the system of common law requires judges 
to build upon their predecessors’ decisions with marginal adaptations over time. This makes 
radical change difficult. Judges’ decision-making in these obscure areas of law has only 
limited public scrutiny and no democratic control. Judges are far from representative of 
citizens –as recently as 2019, ‘senior Judges were the most rarefied group’ amongst the UK’s 
elite, ‘with two thirds attending private schools and 71% graduating from Oxbridge. In fact, 
over half (52%) of senior judges took the same pathway from independent school to 
Oxbridge and then into the judiciary’ (Sutton Trust and the Mobility Commission, 2019). 
 
In September 2016, the Conservative government launched an education consultation paper 
(Department for Education, 2016). Concerned primarily with the state sector, the consultation 
noted the tax privileges enjoyed by private schools, that between 2010 and 2015 their fees 
rose four times faster than average earnings growth, and that the percentage of their pupils 
who came from overseas has gone up by 33 per cent since 2008. It called upon larger private 
schools to do more to help the struggling state sector by either sponsoring a state academy or 
setting up a free school (but without paying any capital or operating expenses), or offering a 
greater proportion of fully-funded bursaries for those unable to pay full fees. Smaller schools 
were invited to provide less substantial ‘partnership’ assistance via, for instance, teacher 
development activities. Crucially, the consultation document stated  
 
We think it is essential that independent schools deliver these new benchmarks. If 
they do not, we will consider legislation to ensure that those independent schools that 
do not observe these new benchmarks cannot enjoy the benefits associated with 
charitable status, and to result in the Charity Commission revising its formal guidance 
to independent schools on how to meet the public benefit test, putting the new 
benchmarks on to a statutory footing. (Department for Education, 2016: 16).  
 
Theresa May launched this consultation in her first major policy speech as Tory Prime 
Minister. The backlash from the schools was immediate; the heads of prestigious schools 
lambasted May for being ‘cheeky’, ‘cheap’ and not understanding that the schools were a 
‘very successful part of the British economy’ (The Telegraph, 9 September 2016).  
 
The government’s 2018 response to consultation (Department for Education, 2018a) took a 
softer line and made no mention of changing any school’s charitable status. Rather, it 
emphasised the joint understanding that it had reached with the ISC, and which was 
published alongside the response (Department for Education, 2018b). Under this, the ISC 
undertook to require member schools to promote social mobility through scholarships, but 
greater emphasis was placed on working in partnership with the state sector – by sponsoring 
schools or providing joint activities (such as sports or other cultural events). It was 
acknowledged that the Upper Tribunal had ruled that trustees had ultimate decision-making 
powers regarding schools’ activities. The schools were not required to support the state sector 
financially, and the government was fulsome in its recognition of the value of the sector. The 
 12 
ISC and the government set up joint working arrangements to facilitate private school 
sponsorship of, and joint activities with, state schools, but not scholarships (Fairburn, 2019). 
 
Capitalising on anti-elite and anti-austerity sentiments, the Labour party mobilised against the 
schools, initially through a Twitter hashtag #AbolishEton. Labour’s November 2019 
manifesto for the general election, committed a Labour government to  
 
close the tax loopholes enjoyed by elite private schools and use that money to 
improve the lives of all children, and we will ask the Social Justice Commission to 
advise on integrating private schools and creating a comprehensive education system. 
(Labour Party 2019:40) 
 
However, Boris Johnson (an Old Etonian) led the Conservatives to a landslide victory in the 
December 2019 election. Unsurprisingly, in September 2019 his government announced that 
it had no plans to change the tax status of the schools.  
 
Concluding remarks  
Some final critical comments on the legal issues involved are apt. Law making on public 
benefit has been sequestered almost entirely to the courts. This is potentially problematic for 
four main reasons. First, radical change can be elusive in common law as it promotes 
incrementalism (Vos, 2018). Second, this is law made by judges who were, and significantly 
still are, the successful products of private schools. Even if they attempt to put class loyalties 
aside, their Weltanschauung has been shaped by their educational experience. Third, law 
making is a societal process. It involves the inscription of social values as formal rules. In 
contrast, parliamentary debate lays bare these subjective decisions. Common law emphasises 
doctrinal work –the repeated, technicist application of precedent. This implies that the law is 
objective and impartial and renders the human intervention involved less visible. Lastly, 
common law shifts decision-making to the relatively unaccountable courts. They are 
wreathed in arcane and obscure language which laypeople find impossible to follow.  
 
Public subsidy via tax expenditures of not-for-profit organisations delivering desirable public 
benefit is a reasonable proposition. However, as we noted, the Public Administration Select 
Committee (2013), opined that decisions as to what constitutes public benefit should be a 
matter for parliament to decide, in line with current public mores. The Conservative 
government, strongly connected with private schools, disagreed. As we have 
comprehensively demonstrated, it is unequivocally in their interests to keep such matters in 
the courts.  
 
Tax law is less frequently a matter for common law; government must design taxes to suit its 
expenditure plans by legislating. Statute law can accrue legitimacy by being the product of a 
democratic process. But, private schools’ tax breaks have largely escaped even this scrutiny 
because, as tax expenditures, the decisions to grant them is made once and not revisited 
unless there is a move to amend them. As we illustrated, this rarely happens. Tax 
expenditures are not quantified – inhibiting parliament from considering the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the expenditure.  
 
Throughout, we have unequivocally established that the determination of the tax status of 
private schools has been marked by the setting of the rules of the game by those in power 
through the courts or parliament. This has, literally, legitimised the tax breaks. This capture 
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of law-making has been largely hidden from public awareness and scrutiny.  Thus, the tax 
privileges of private schools are both perfectly lawful and largely ‘under the radar’.  
 
In sum, this paper explains the elaborate legal and linguistic logics associated with the 
significant tax concessions that private schools in England currently receive. It showed how 
the legal concepts of charitable status, charitable purposes, charitable activities and public 
benefit are central the provision of such breaks. The current situation evolved over some 400 
years. We unveiled its complex, and sometimes contested, socio-legal history by drawing 
together insights from critical studies of law, taxation and elite schools.  
 
We demonstrate that ruling elites associated with elite private schools have consistently 
mobilised the considerable resources at their disposal to ensure that, no matter what the 
occasional challenges, tax and charity law continue to operate in their favour. These material, 
institutional and discursive resources have been put to use in the courts and, where that failed, 
parliament to normalise and legitimise their privileges down through the centuries. No 
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